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A steadily growing pervasion of the energy distribution grid with communication tech-
nology is widely seen as an enabler for new computational coordination techniques 
for renewable, distributed generation as well as for bundling with controllable con-
sumers. Smart markets will foster a decentralized grid management. One important 
task as prerequisite to decentralized management is the ability to group together in 
order to jointly gain enough suitable flexibility and capacity to assume responsibility 
for a specific control task in the grid. In self-organized smart grid scenarios, grouping 
or coalition formation has to be achieved in a decentralized and situation aware way 
based on individual capabilities. We present a fully decentralized coalition formation 
approach based on an established agent-based heuristics for predictive scheduling 
with the additional advantage of keeping all information about local decision base and 
local operational constraints private. Two closely interlocked optimization processes 
orchestrate an overall procedure that adapts a coalition structure to best suit a given 
set of energy products. The approach is evaluated in several simulation scenarios with 
different type of established models for integrating distributed energy resources and is 
also extended to the induced use case of surplus distribution using basically the same 
algorithm.
1. Introduction
Across Europe, especially in Germany where currently a financial security of guaranteed feed-in prices is given, 
the share of distributed energy resources (DER) is rapidly growing. Following the goal defined by the European 
Commission (European Parliament & Council, 2009), a concept for integration into electricity markets is needed 
for both: active power provision and ancillary services (Abarrategui et al., 2009; Nieße et al., 2012) to reduce 
subsidy dependence. A well-known concept for aggregating DER to a jointly controllable entity is known as 
virtual power plant (VPP). Apart from controlling distributed electricity generation, e.g. combined heat and 
power (CHP), photovoltaic or wind power, controllable consumption like shiftable loads, heat pumps or air 
conditioning might also be included for planning active power schedules. Battery storages are a much-discussed 
subject to complement such groups of DER.
Virtual power plants are a well-known means for aggregating and controlling DER (Awerbuch and Preston, 
1997) and their requisite integration into current and future market structures recently led to VPP systems that 
frequently re-configure themselves for a market and product-led alignment (Nieße et al., 2014). Based on the size 
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of products from the order book (e. g. traded at a day-ahead market), coalitions of usually small energy resources 
have to be found that may apply for the product, as single units often do not have a sufficient power level nor the 
flexibility to fulfill the product alone. The same will hold true for other energy products; for instance for control 
power. In scenarios with self-dependently operated units that trade their power independently, consequentially 
self-organizing algorithms are required also for coalition formation to find potential partners specifically for the 
current product at hand.
In general, distributed control schemes based on multi-agent systems are considered advantageous for large- 
scale problems as expected in future smart grids due to the large number of distributed energy resources that 
take over control tasks from large-scale central power plants (Nieße et al., 2012). Some recent implementations 
are (Hinrichs et al., 2013a; Ramchurn et al., 2011; Kamphuis et al., 2007). Distributed organization and self- 
organized control is also a special characteristic of dynamic virtual power plants (Nieße et al., 2014) whereof 
efficient coalition formation is an essential requirement, but with hard combinatorial specifications.
We adapted an approach for decentralized predictive scheduling (COHDA) (Hinrichs et al., 2014) that al-
ready rendered efficient for decentralized combinatorial problems and that provides the additional advantage 
of keeping all information about local decision base’s and local operational constraints private. In (Bremer and 
Lehnhoff, 2016) it has been further developed to decentralized coalition formation and here we extend the idea 
to fair surplus distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. As a start, a review of related approaches with focus on appli-
cations to the smart grid is given. We then introduce the concept of basic COHDA and our extensions to the use 
case of coalition formation. Finally, a conclusion is drawn with results from several simulation runs that prove 
applicability. In addition, we extend the ideas of COHDA and the adaption to coalition structure generation to 
fair decentralized surplus distribution within coalitions after product delivery.
2. Related Work
Market integration of virtual power plants sometimes demands for dynamic aggregation when it comes to ener-
gy product centric clustering of units for better trading positions (Nieße et al., 2014).
In order to address the integration of the current market situation, (Nieße et al., 2014) introduces the concept 
of a dynamic virtual power plant (DVPP). In this approach VPPs gather dynamically together with respect to 
concrete electricity products at an energy market. Coalition will will diverge right after delivery and reform for 
the successive planning period. Grouping sets of agents together so as to form coalitions is one of the major 
interaction concepts within the field of multi-agent systems. The usual reason for grouping agents is that a group 
of agents jointly might achieve a goal better than a single agent (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Kahan and Rapoport, 
1984). Often, having a group of agents is indispensable in the smart grid field because, a single energy unit 
usually has not the capability to achieve a certain goal alone. Nevertheless, it is possible to have different alter-
native groups consisting of a different mixture of agents. In more complex scenarios where different groups are 
needed at the same time for different control tasks or product delivery, different structures of groups of groups 
are also possible.
Clearly, each agent (or the associated real unit) possesses certain traits or benefits that contribute to the 
overall success of the coalition with different amount. In some use cases, the utility of the members of a coa-
lition may be easily quantified. For example, (Hsu and Soo, 2009) studies several examples from the transport 
sector; with numbers of drivers or trucks and costs expressed in dollar. In the use case studied in this paper, the 
utility has to be expressed as the contribution that eases a joint planning problem (jointly planning individual 
loads for gaining a desired aggregated schedule) that has to be expressed in terms of traits and size of individual 
search spaces of alternative schedules. Thus, each agent contributes an abstract flexibility to the joint task. The 
actually chosen schedule is not necessarily proportional to the agent’s utility, because the richness of offered 
opportunities (moreover in case of having backup capabilities for later re-scheduling) has to be considered, not 
the taken choice. The role of integrating whole flexibility considerations into decentralized value calculations 
has for example been studied in (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b).
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For a self-organized partitioning in such volatile environment, a controlling agent needs a means to generate 
a set of feasible schedules to choose appropriate ones for negotiation at market. In order to implement agents 
that are able to control and represent arbitrary energy units, a technique is needed that is able to generate feasible 
schedules without knowledge on the actual operation of the device, cost functions or technical constraints of 
the controlled unit.
Classical approaches to coalition formation (Rahwan et al., 2015; Gensollen et al., 2015; Vinyals et al., 
2012; Bistaffa et al., 2012) are either not decentralized and thus do not fully comply with requirements resulting 
from the large number of decentralized energy resources (Nieße et al., 2012), do not take into account individ-
ually flexibilities and operation constraints of individual units or rely on integrated models and thus on specific, 
restricted implementations. Other approaches specialize to sub use cases, e. g. electric vehicles (Bazzan and de 
O. Ramos, 2015), to ease computation.
As opposed to the here scrutinized distribution of joint effort for value maximization, distributing joint cost 
is a long discussed topic (Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b). The division of sur-
plus has applications in production (Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Sen, 1966), electricity pricing (Lima et al., 
1995), public goods (Mas-Colell, 1980; Champsaur, 1975), and other situations modeled by cooperative games. 
A survey of coalition games applied to several use cases in the smart grid can be found in (Saad et al., 2012); 
e.g. some utility functions (analytically calculable) are given, but profit distribution is not discussed.
In recent years, researchers have investigated a variety of approaches to coalition structure generation as 
a major challenge in multi-agent systems (Rahwan et al., 2014). An overview can for example be found in 
(Rahwan et al., 2015). The main problems in all solutions arise with execution performance, solution quality 
or memory requirements (Rahwan et al., 2014). Several algorithms have also been developed for coalition 
formation especially in the smart grid; e. g. (Gensollen et al., 2015; Vinyals et al., 2012; Bistaffa et al., 2012). 
The focus in this works lies on constructing stable, i. e. long term, coalitions whereas dynamic reconfigurations 
are hardly supported. Individual DER models for determining volatile, individual sets of situation-dependent 
flexibilities are not integrated. All approaches from the smart grid field are either not decentralized and thus will 
hardly cope with the expected large number of decentralized energy resources (Nieße et al., 2012), do not take 
into account the set of individual, unit specific sets of alternative capabilities or rely on integrated models and 
thus on specific, restricted implementations.
A first formal model for a fully self-organized solution has been presented in (Beer and Appelrath, 2013). In 
general, decentralized algorithms are considered advantageous in many fields of smart grid computation (Nieße 
et al., 2012; Ramchurn et al., 2012). For the case of predictive scheduling, (Hinrichs et al., 2014) developed 
a decentralized algorithm for constrained combinatorial problems. Combined with an appropriate abstraction 
from individual flexibilities (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013a), it has been successfully applied to dynamic 
day-ahead market scenarios (Nieße et al., 2014) for intra coalition optimization. In (Bremer and Lehnhoff, 
2016) this approach has been extended to the use case of decentralized coalition formation.
3. Algorithm
3.1. COHDA
We start with a brief recap of the used base algorithm. The Combinatorial Optimization Heuristics for Distrib-
uted Agents (COHDA) was originally introduced in (Hinrichs et al., 2013b; Hinrichs et al., 2014). Since then 
it has been applied to a variety of smart grid applications (Hinrichs et al., 2013a; Nieße et al., 2014; Nieße and 
Sonnenschein, 2015; Sonnenschein et al., 2015b). With our explanations we follow (Hinrichs et al., 2014).
Originally, COHDA has been designed as a fully distributed solution to the predictive scheduling problem 
(as distributed constraint optimization formulation) in smart grid management (Hinrichs et al., 2013b). In this 
scenario, each agent in the multi-agent system is in charge of controlling exactly one distributed energy re-
source (generator or controllable consumer) with procuration for negotiating the energy. All energy resources 
are drawn together to a virtual power plant and the controlling agents form a coalition that has to control the 
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VPP in a distributed way. It is the goal for the predictive scheduling problem to find exactly one schedule for 
each energy unit such that
1. each assigned schedule can be operated by the respective energy unit without violating any hard technical 
constraint, and
2. the difference between the sum of all targets and a desired given target schedule is minimized.
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Figure 1: Example for a discrete version of the search space for a co-generation plant. Usually, 2000 different,
operable schedules to choose from are used in this contribution. A state-of-charge of 50% at night and an
increased thermal demand for showering in the morning and dish washing in the evening result in higher
flexibilities during these periods.
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Figure 2: Example for a training set of schedules for a heat pump with a maximum deviation of 500Wh from the
integral of set thermal demand.
The target schedule usually comprises 96 time intervals of 15 minutes each with a given amount of energy (or
equivalently mean active power) for each time interval, but might also be constituted for a shorter time frame by
a given energy product that the coalition has to deliver.
An agent in COHDA does not represent a complete solution as it is the case for instance in population-based
approaches (Poli et al., 2007; Karaboga and Basturk, 2007). Each agent represents a class within a multiple
choice knapsack combinatorial problem (Lust and Teghem, 2010). Applied to predictive scheduling each class
refers to the feasible region in the solution space of the respective energy unit. Each agent chooses schedules
as solution candidate only from the set of feasible schedules that belongs to the DER controlled by this agent.
Each agent is connected with a rather small subset of other agents from the multi-agent system and may only
communicate with agents from this limited neighborhood. The neighborhood (communication network) is
defined by a small world graph (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). As long as this graph is at least simply connected,
each agent collects information from the direct neighborhood and as each received message also contains (not
necessarily up-to-date) information from the transitive neighborhood, each agent may accumulate information
about the choices of other agents and thus gains his own local belief of the aggregated schedule that the other
agents are going to operate. With this belief each agent may choose a schedule for the own controlled energy
unit in a way that the coalition is put forward best while at the same time own constraints are obeyed and own
interests are pursued.
All choices for own schedules are rooted in incomplete knowledge and beliefs in what other agents do;
gathered from received messages. The taken choice (together with the basis for decision-making) is communicated
to all neighbors and in this way knowledge is successively spread throughout the coalition without any central
memory. This process is repeated. Because all spread information about schedule choices is labeled with an
age, each agent may decide easily whether the own knowledge repository has to be updated upon message
reception. Any update results in recalculating of the own best schedule contribution and spreading it to the direct
neighbors. By and by all agents accumulate complete information and as soon as no agent is capable of offering
a schedule that results in a better solution, the algorithm converges and terminates. Convergence has been proved
in (Hinrichs, 2014).
More formally, each time an agent receives a message, three successive steps are conducted. First, during the
perceive phase an agent a j updates its own working memory κ j with the received working memory κi from agent
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memory. This process is repeated. Because all spread information about schedule choices is labeled with an age, 
each agent may decide easily whether the own knowledge repository has to be updated upon message reception. 
Any update results in recalculating of the own best schedule contribution and spreading it to the direct neigh-
bors. By and by all agents accumulate complete information and as soon as no agent is capable of offering a 
schedule that results in a better solution, the algorithm converges and terminates. Convergence has been proved 
in (Hinrichs, 2014).
More formally, each time an agent receives a message, three successive steps are conducted. First, during 
the perceive phase an agent a j updates its own working memory κ j with the received working memory κi from 
agent ai. From the foreign working memory the objective of the optimization (i. e. the target schedule) is im-
ported (if not already known) as well as the configuration that constitutes the calculation base of neighboring 
agent ai. An update is conducted if the received configuration is larger or has achieved a better objective value. 
In this way, schedules that reflect the so far best choices of other agents and that are not already known in the 
own working memory are imported from the received memory.
During the following decision phase agent a j has to decide on the best choice for his own schedule based 
on the updated belief about the system state γk . Index k indicates the age of the system state information. The 
agent knows which schedules of a subset (or all) of the schedule that other agents are going to operate. Thus, 
the schedule that fills the gap to the desired target schedule exactly can be easily identified. Due to operational 
constraints of the controlled DER, this optimal schedule can usually not be operated. In addition, other rea-
sons might render some schedules largely unattractive due to high cost. Because of this reason, each agent is 
equipped with a so called decoder that automatically maps the identified optimal schedule to a nearby feasible 
schedule that is operable by the DER and thus feasible. Based on a set of feasible schedules sampled from an 
appropriate simulation model for flexibility prediction (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013c), a decoder can e. 
g. be based directly on this set (by linearly searching the schedule with the smallest deviation) or be built by 
learning a support vector model after the approach of (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013a). Both approaches 
– with individual advantages and drawbacks regarding computational complexity, search space size and accu-
racy – have been tested here.
Figure 1 shows an example training set of 96-dimensional schedules taken from the model of a co-gener-
ation plant with simulated detached house defining a heat demand based on weather induced losses and hot 
water drawing profiles. Figure 2 shows a second example with a training set derived from a heat pump model. 
Such training sets define the individual flexibility of an energy resource for a given time horizon (in this case 96 
intervals of 15 minutes each) and serve as the stencil from which the abstract machine learning model as well as 
the simple linear model and the decoder for generating automatically feasible schedules are derived.
As the whole procedure is based exclusively on local decisions, each agent decides privately which sched-
ules are taken. Private interest and preferences can be included and all information on the flexibility of the local 
DER is kept private.
If the objective value for the configuration with this new candidate is better, this new schedule is kept as 
selected one. Finally, if a new solution candidate has been found, the working memory with this new configu-
ration is sent to all agents in the local neighborhood upon which these recipients conduct the same process for 
themself. The procedure terminates, as soon as all agents reach the same system state, no better solutions are 
found, and no new messages are generated. Then all agents know the same final result.
3.2. Decentralized Coalition Formation
In general, a set of units has to be assigned to a given electricity product such that the assigned group is capa-
ble of jointly operating the target schedule defined by the product. If a set of products is given, the set of all 
available energy units has to be divided out to the different products in a way that the outcome (generated by 
product delivery) for the units and product fulfilment are maximized concurrently. The problem of partitioning 
a set of agents into several groups is a coalition structure generation problem (Nieße et al., 2014). Given is a set 
of products P. Each product P ∈ P defines a schedule P = (p1, . . . , pd ) ∈ Rd that defines for each time interval 
i a value pi of mean active power that is to be delivered as close as possible. Usually, 15 minute time intervals 
for a given product horizon d (up to 96 intervals) are considered. We do not consider the origin of the products. 
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Energy products might be drawn from some energy market like active power or reserve control markets. In 
this contribution we restrict our simulations w.l.o.g. to day-ahead active power trading but take all products as 
already given from some earlier market phase. In addition to the product set P a set of agents A is given.
We want to find a coalition structure CS = (A1, . . . , A|P| ) such that the following implication holds: Ai ∈Aj 
⇒Ai ∉/ ∪k≠j Ak , i.e. each agent may only be part of exactly one coalition but does not necessarily have to join a 
coalition. Usually in coalition structure formation one wants to maximize the profit of the coalition structure. In 
our use case we want to equivalently minimize the deviation from the coalition’s ability to fulfil their assigned 
energy product and thus define the value v(CS) of a coalition structure CS as
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xAi ∈ FUi , ∀Ai ∈CS. (2)
Eq. (1) defines the value v(CS) as the sum of minimal deviations δ (w.l.o.g. the Euclidean distance has been
used) between a coalition’s best schedule choice and the respective target product. This means, each coalition
gathers flexibilities from different DER such that each coalition can distribute the effort of jointly achieving the
product to feasible schedules for the respective coalition members. As a constraint (2), schedules must be taken
from the subset FUi of feasible schedules. Each unit Ui defines its individual feasible region based on individual
technical and economical restrictions and on current operational state and forecasts (e. g. weather, etc.).
COHDA can easily conduct different types of combinatorial optimization if the decision phase is appropriately
adapted to the problem at hand. Some minor changes for objective evaluation and working memory content are
additionally necessary. We adopted COHDA for solving the coalition formation problem as follows. The system
configuration γi denotes the assignment of each (so far known) agent to a coalition; i. e. each agent may assign
itself to exactly one coalition (denoted by the index of the chosen product) or may choose not to be a member of
any coalition (index 0). After receiving an updated system configuration with assignments from other agents, a
decision has to be made on the best own assignment. To achieve this, the agent tests all possible assignments for




CSa j∈Ai denotes a coalition structure with agent a j being a member of coalition i (or not in a coalition if i = 0).
The value of the coalition is given by the residual error Eq. (1). Thus, the better the ability of the coalitions
to resemble the target schedules defined by the associated products, the better the coalition structure. In this
way, evaluating the objective (3) comprises a number of inner optimization processes. Evaluating an assignment
necessitates solving the optimization problem of finding best schedules for each coalition in order to calculate Eq.
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The value of the coalition is given by the residual error Eq. (1). Thus, the better the ability of the coalitions
to resemble the target schedules defined by the associated products, the better the coalition structure. In this
way, evaluating the objective (3) comprises a number of inner optimization processes. Evaluating an assignment
necessitates solving the optimization problem of finding best schedules for each coalition in order to calculate Eq.
Advances in Distributed Computing and
Artificial Intelligence Journal
c©Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd
7
ADCAIJ, Regular Issue Vol 3 n.3 (2015)
http://adcaij.usal.es
Eq. (1) defines the value v(CS) as the sum of minimal deviatio s δ (w.l.o.g. the Euclidean distance has been 
use ) between a coalition’s best schedul  choice nd the r spective target product. This means, each coalitio  
gathers flexibilities from different DER uch t at each coalition ca  distribute the effort of jointly achieving the 
produ t to feasible schedul  for the respective coalition members. As a constraint (2), schedules must be taken
from the subset FUi f feasible schedul . Each unit Ui defines its individual f asible region b sed on indi-
vidual technical and economical restrictions and on cur ent operational state and forecasts (e. g. weather, etc.).
COHDA can e sily con uct different types of combinat rial optimiz ti  if th  decisi n phase is appro-
priately dapted to th  problem at ha d. Some minor changes for objective evaluation nd working memory 
content are additionally necessary. We adopted COHDA for solving the coalition formation pr bl m as follows. 
The system configuration γi denotes the assignment of ach (so far kn wn) agent to a coaliti n; i. e. each agent 
may assign i self to exactly one coalition (denoted by the index of the chos  product) or may choose not to be 
a member of any coalition (i dex 0). After receiving an updated system configuration with assignments from 
other agents, a decision has to be made on the best own assignment. To achieve this, the agent tests all possible 
assignments for its own DER for finding the one with the smallest error:
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products P . Each pr duct P ∈ P defines a schedule P = (p1, . . . , pd) ∈ Rd that defines f each ti interval i
a value i of mean ac iv power that i to be d livered s close as possibl . Usually, 15 minute tim int rval
f r a given product horizon d ( p t 96 intervals) are consi ered. We do n t consider th origin of the product .
En rg products ight be d awn from some nergy market like active pow r or reserve control markets. In this
contributio we restrict ur s mulations w.l.o.g. to day-ahead active power trading but take al pr ducts a already
given from some earl er m rket phase. In addition to the product set P a set of age ts A is given.
We want to find a coalit on structure CS = (A1, . . . ,A|P |) such that the following implicati holds: Ai ∈
A j ⇒ Ai /∈
⋃
k = j Ak, i.e. each agent ay only be part of exactly on liti but d es n t necessarily have
o join a coalitio . Usually in coalition struc ure formation one wants t maximiz the profit of the coalition
structure. In our use case we want to equivalently minimize the deviation from the coalition’s ability to fulfil
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CSaj∈Ai denotes a coalition structure with agent aj being a member of coalition i (or not in a coalition if 
i = 0). The value of the coalition is given by the residual error Eq. (1). Thus, the better the ability of the co-
alitions to resemble the target schedules defined by the associated products, the better the coalition structure. 
In this way, evaluating the objective (3) comprises a number of inner optimization processes. Evaluating an 
assignment necessitates solving the optimization problem of finding best schedules for each coalition in order 
to calculate Eq.
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Figure 3: Basic architecture and process of coalition formation as nested decentralized combinatorial
optimization.
(1). This task is achieved by starting standard COHDA processes as described in (Hinrichs et al., 2014) on the
respective subset of agents (belonging to the coalition at question) and a respectively smaller communication
overlay network. Figure 3 illustrates the overall process and the interaction between the different COHDA
instances. These COHDA behaviours are interlaced with the main coalition formation COHDA behaviour. Thus,
working memories κ j,c are distinguished by an additional identifying key c; cf. Figure 3.
Two interlaced and interacting COHDA processes do the work as shown in Figure 3. One COHDA process
(the outer) determines during its decision phase the best assignment to a coalition by probing each possible one
(left part of Figure 3). Evaluating an assignment of one’s own controlled energy resource to a coalition (a belief
about the assignment of other agents is derived combining the information from received messages) incorporates
a need for solving a predictive scheduling optimization problem for each assignment. In order to solve this
(inner) optimization problem, the outer process is paused and a new COHDA process is initiated by emitting
a message to an agent from the neighborhood. The inner process comprises only agents from the currently
evaluated coalition and thus the neighborhood is smaller (right side of Figure 3 that illustrates the internal process
of the decision stage of the outer process). When the inner optimization process terminates with a value of the
tested coalition, the next inner evaluation process is started. After all possible assignments have been tested, the
best is chosen and the outer process continues.
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(1). This task is achieved by starting standard COHDA processes as described in (Hinrichs et al., 2014) on the 
respective subset of agents (belonging to the coalition at question) and a respectively smaller communication 
overlay network. Figure 3 illustrates the overall process and the interaction between the different COHDA in-
stances. These COHDA behaviours are interlaced with the main coalition formation COHDA behaviour. Thus, 
working memories κj,c are distinguished by an additional identifying key c; cf. Figure 3.
Two interlaced and interacting COHDA processes do the work as shown in Figure 3. One COHDA process 
(the outer) determines during its decision phase the best assignment to a coalition by probing each possible one 
(left part of Figure 3). Evaluating an assignment of one’s own controlled energy resource to a coalition (a belief 
about the assignment of other agents is derived combining the information from received messages) incorpo-
rates a need for solving a predictive scheduling optimization problem for each assignment. In order to solve this 
(inner) optimization problem, the outer process is paused and a new COHDA process is initiated by emitting a 
message to an agent from the neighborhood. The inner process comprises only agents from the currently eval-
uated coalition and thus the neighborhood is smaller (right side of Figure 3 that illustrates the internal process 
of the decision stage of the outer process). When the inner optimization process terminates with a value of the 
tested coalition, the next inner evaluation process is started. After all possible assignments have been tested, the 
best is chosen and the outer process continues.
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Figure 4: Mean convergence behavior of several test runs (100 each) for different scenarios for the first execution
steps of the outer combinatorics. The intermediate best solution quality was collected during executing the
multi-agent system with the help of a global observer. This data collection is not part of the otherwise fully
decentralized algorithm.
4. Results
The evaluation of our approach was done by simulation experiments. In our test setting, each energy unit is
associated with a controlling agent responsible for conducting local decisions and communication with other
agents. For simulating distributed energy resources we used a model for co-generation plants that has already
served in several studies and projects for evaluation (Bremer et al., 2010; Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013a;
Neugebauer et al., 2015; Hinrichs et al., 2013a; Nieße and Sonnenschein, 2015). This model comprises a
micro CHP with 4.7 kW of rated electrical power (12.6 kW thermal power) bundled with a thermal buffer
store. Constraints restrict power band, buffer charging, gradients, minimum runtime, and satisfaction of thermal
demand. The relationship between electrical (active) power and thermal power was modeled after engine test
benches. Thermal demand is determined by simulating a detached house (including hot water drawing) according
to given weather profiles. In addition, we used models for heat pumps and boilers for hot water provision
(Sonnenschein et al., 2015a). For each agent the model is individually (randomly) configured with state of charge,
weather condition, temperature range, allowed operation gradients, and similar. From these model instances, the
respective training sets for building the decoders have been generated with the sampling approach from (Bremer
and Sonnenschein, 2013c).
Figure 4 shows the results of some first convergence experiments with coalitions of co-generation plants.
In order to ensure the reproducibility of results as well as the measurability of convergence, an event-based
simulation of our multi-agent system with a discrete time model and with asynchronous execution within each
time step has been used for testing. Shown are the achieved mean residual errors. Please note that in each
of these time steps of the outer algorithm a different number of agents has to conduct the inner (predictive
scheduling algorithm) several times in order to evaluate the value of each possible coalition structure during the
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associated with a controlling agent responsible for conducting local decisions and communication with other 
agents. For simulating distributed energy resources we used a model for co-generation plants that has already 
served in several studies and projects for evaluation (Bremer et al., 2010; Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013a; 
Neugebauer et al., 2015; Hinrichs et al., 2013a; Nieße and Sonnenschein, 2015). This model comprises a micro 
CHP with 4.7 kW of rated electrical power (12.6 kW thermal power) bundled with a thermal buffer store. Con-
straints restrict power band, buffer charging, gradients, minimum runtime, and satisfaction of thermal demand. 
The relationship between electrical (active) power and thermal power was modeled after engine test benches. 
Thermal demand is determined by simulating a detached house (including hot water drawing) according to 
given weather profiles. In addition, we used models for heat pumps and boilers for hot water provision (Son-
nenschein et al., 2015a). For each agent the model is individually (randomly) configured with state of charge, 
weather condition, temperature range, allowed operation gradients, and similar. From these model instances, 
the respective training sets for building the decoders have been generated with the sampling approach from 
(Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013c).
Figure 4 shows the results of some first convergence experiments with coalitions of co-generation plants. In 
order to ensure the reproducibility of results as well as the measurability of convergence, an event-based simu-
lation of our multi-agent system with a discrete time model and with asynchronous execution within each time 
step has been used for testing. Shown are the achieved mean residual errors. Please note that in each of these 
time steps of the outer algorithm a different number of agents has to conduct the inner (predictive scheduling 
algorithm) several times in order to evaluate the value of each possible coalition structure during the
37
Jörg Bremer and Sebastian Lehnhoff
Decentralized Coalition Formation  
with Agent-based Combinatorial Heuristics
ADCAIJ: Advances in Distributed Computing 
and Articial Intelligence Journal 
Regular Issue, Vol. 6 N. 3 (2017), 29-44 
eISSN: 2255-2863 - http://adcaij.usal.es
© Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca - cc by
Jörg Bremer et al Decentralized coalition formation











Figure 5: Example result for a scenario with two block products. One (30 minutes in the morning) tailor made for
the boilers in the agent set and one in the evening suitable for the heat pumps. Without knowing the unit under
control the set of agents splits apart correctly and schedules are assigned (taking also into account the operation
of the rest of the day) such that product fulfilment is maximized while all technical constraints are obeyed.
decision phase. All simulations have been stopped early after 15 and accordingly 50 steps to demonstrate the fast
convergence. The omitted improvements during later time steps are rather marginal.
Figure 4(a) shows the results of two easy problem instances with 50 and 100 units and 3 block products
for a 2 hour period (resolution: 15 minutes) as for example traded at the European Power Exchange 1. The
height of the load has been chosen with respect to the mean operated power of all CHP. Nevertheless, it is not
guaranteed that a coalition can be found for each product such that it is possible to find a schedule for each unit
in the coalition such that the aggregated schedule of all units in the coalition resembles the product exactly. As











has been used for products over d time periods with product power pi and joint coalition power xi at interval
i. Scaled in this way, results with different number of units and power levels can be compared by the mean
deviation in percent from the wanted power. MAPE allows comparing coalitions of different size. Please note
that minimizing some error for the coalition structure is equivalent to maximizing some given revenue measure.
Figure 4(b) shows results for more complex scenarios. Figure 4(c) takes into consideration products for a
whole day and uses the support vector decoder as search space model instead of the discrete model. Here an exact
result was achievable if the right CHPs are in the right coalition and the schedules are chosen appropriately.
Figure 5 shows an example result for a scenario with two different block products: one tailor made for the
heat pumps in the scenario and one suitable for the boilers (although again an exact solution was not achievable).
The set of all agents is split up into two coalitions (not being in a coalition was again an allowed option for
an agent) while flexibilities of all units for the whole day had to be kept in mind when calculating possible
contributions to the shorter intra-day products. The figure shows the aggregated schedules for the whole day and
the two products.
1http://www.epexspot.com
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decision phase. All simulations have been stopped early after 15 and accordingly 50 steps to demonstrate the 
fast convergence. The omitted improvements during later time steps are rather marginal.
Figure 4(a) shows the results of two easy problem instances with 50 and 100 units and 3 block products for 
a 2 hour period (resolution: 15 minutes) as for example traded at the European Power Exchange1. The height 
of the load has been chosen with respect to the mean operated power of all CHP. Nevertheless, it is not guaran-
teed that a coalition can be found for each product such that it is possible to find a schedule for each unit in the 
coalition such that the aggregated schedule of all units in the coalition resembles the product exactly. As error 
measure, the mean absolute percentage (MAPE) measure 
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has been used for products over d time periods with product power pi and joint coalition power xi at interval 
i. Scaled in this way, results with different number of units and power levels can be compared by the mean 
deviation in percent from the wanted power. MAPE allows comparing coalitions of different size. Please note 
that minimizing some error for the coalition structure is equivalent to maximizing some given revenue measure. 
Figure 4(b) shows results for more complex scenarios. Figure 4(c) takes into consideration products for a whole 
day and uses the support vector decoder as search space model instead of the discrete model. Here an exact 
result was achievable if the right CHPs are in the right coalition and the schedules are chosen appropriately.
Figure 5 shows an example result for a scenario with two different block products: one tailor made for the 
heat pumps in the scenario and one suitable for the boilers (although again an exact solution was not achiev-
able). The set of all agents is split up into two coalitions (not being in a coalition was again an allowed option 
for an agent) while flexibilities of all units for the whole day had to be kept in mind when calculating possible 
contributions to the shorter intra-day products. The figure shows the aggregated schedules for the whole day 
and the two products.
1. http://www.epexspot.com.
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Table 1. Results of different coalition formation scenarios. The residual error is given as MAPE dM Eq. (4). 
Evaluations are counted as number of decisions on coalition assignment (outer) and decision  
on optimal schedule choice (inner)
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Table 1: Results of different coalition formation scenarios. The residual error is given as MAPE dM Eq. (4).
Evaluations are counted as number of decisions on coalition assignment (outer) and decision on optimal schedule
choice (inner).
scenario error outer evaluations inner evaluations
CHP 0.24971 ± 0.23290 2655.31 ± 1450.40 176539.42 ± 101171.13
HP 1.1545×10−3 ± 2.2155×10−4 3864.07 ± 1492.07 299072.67 ± 115364.16
Mixed 1 4.5084×10−15 ± 8.3635×10−16 6494.50 ± 3776.21 663890.85 ± 417128.31
Mixed 2 0.08572 ± 0.34291 9908.12 ± 3157.91 1115235.44 ± 379695.34
In Table 1 several scenarios are compared with regard to the achieved result quality and the used number of
objective evaluations. The scenarios are:
CHP: A scenario with 10 agent controlled CHP with randomly chosen initial operation state regarding state of
charge, weather condition and possible gradients. Two coalitions for two products covering a time range of
96 intervals of 15 minutes each are sought. Both products have been chosen such that an exact fulfilment
(zero error) could be achieved. Support vector decoders have been used as search space models.
HP: This is basically the same scenario as for the CHPs but with 10 heat pumps. This time, the discrete model
has been used as search space.
Mixed 1: This scenario consists of 5 CHP, 5 heat pumps, 5 boilers and 3 products. Each product was tailor made
for one of the groups of units. Thus, an error of zero was achievable. For modeling the search space, the
discrete model with 100 different possible schedules for each unit has been used.
Mixed 2: The setup for this scenario was the same as for Mixed 1. This time a discrete model with 200 schedules
had been used for each unit; resulting in an increase in problem size.
Table 1 shows the residual error (MAPE dM) that has been achieved together with the number of conducted
evaluations of the objective function distinguished in outer (agent decides on coalition assignment) and inner
(agent decides on appropriateness of the schedule selection within a questioned coalition) objective.
5. Surplus Distribution
In single owned VPP it is quite easy to establish a centralized control instance and moreover: no need arises
for a distribution of any generated surplus. In case of a coalition of temporarily pooled but individually owned
and operated units (as expected in smart grid scenarios), on the other hand, the question for a fair distribution
of jointly earned profit has not yet sufficiently been answered. Self-organized coalitions on all accounts need a
scheme for self-organized and thus decentralized surplus distribution.
Each agent possesses certain traits or benefits that contribute differently to the overall success of the coalition.
In some use cases, the utility of the members of a coalition may be easily quantified. For example, (Hsu and Soo,
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In Table 1 several scenarios are compared with regard to the achieved result quality and the used number of 
objective evaluations. The scenarios are:
CHP: A scenario with 10 agent controlled CHP with randomly chosen initial operation state regarding 
state of charge, weather condition and possible gradients. Two coalitions for two products covering a 
time range of 96 intervals of 15 minutes each are sought. Both products have been chosen such that an 
exact fulfilment (zero error) could be achieved. Support vector decoders have been used as search space 
models.
HP: This is basically the same scenario as for the CHPs but with 10 heat pumps. This time, the discrete 
model has been used as search space.
Mixed 1: This scenario consists of 5 CHP, 5 heat pumps, 5 boilers and 3 products. Each product was tailor 
made for one of the groups of units. Thus, an error of zero was achievable. For modeling the search space, 
the discrete model with 100 different possible schedules for each unit has been used.
Mixed 2: The setup for this scenario was the same as for Mixed 1. This time a discrete model with 200 
schedules had be n used for each unit; resulting in an i crease in problem size.
Table 1 shows the residual error (MAPE dM) that has been achieved together with the number of conducted 
evaluations of the objective function distinguished in outer (agent decides on coalition assignment) and inner 
(agent decides on appropriateness of the schedule selection within a questioned coalition) objective.
5. Surplus Distribution
I  single owned VPP it is quite ea y to establish a centralized c ntrol i stanc  and more ver: no need arises 
for a distribution of any generated rplus. In cas  of a coalition of temporarily pooled but individually owned 
and op rated units (as expected in smart grid scenarios), on the other hand, the question for a fair distribution 
of jointly ear ed profit has not yet sufficiently been answered. Self-organized coalitions on all accounts need a 
sche e for self-organized and thus d centralized surplus distribution.
Each agent possesses certain traits or benefits that contribute differently to the overall success of the co-
alition. In some use cases, the utility of the members of a coalition may be easily quantified. For example, 
(Hsu and Soo, 2009) stud es several examples from the transport sector with numbers of drivers or trucks and 
costs expressed in dollar. In the use case studied in (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b), the u ility has to be 
expressed as the contribution that eases a joint planning problem (jointly planning individual load for gaining a 
wanted aggregated schedule) what has to be expressed in terms of traits and size of individual search spaces of 
alternative schedules and thus in terms of individual flexibility. The actually chosen schedule is not necessarily 
proportional to the utility of the unit because the richness of offered opportunities (moreover in case of having 
backup capabilities for later re-scheduling) has to be considered; not the taken choice.
Distributing joint cost is a long discussed topic (Friedman and Moulin, 1999). The division of surplus has 
use cases and applications in production (Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Sen, 1966), electricity pricing (Lima et 
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al., 1995), public goods (Mas-Colell, 1980; Champsaur, 1975), and other situations modeled by cooperative 
games. Cooperative game theory is concerned with problems from coalition formation in multi agent systems 
and desirable properties of such coalitions (Fatima et al., 2008; Rapoport, 1970). Among others, cooperative 
game theory offers concepts for fair distribution of jointly earned gains among all members of a coalition. The 
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is such a concept for fair payoff distribution (Hsu and Soo, 2009).
If cooperative behaviour is enforced by offering better payoff for an agent within coalitions (groups of 
players), the competition is between coalitions rather than between individual agents. Such game is said to be 
a coalition game. If the utility may be exchanged between players (for example by side payments) the game is 
said to have a transferable utility.
Let N be a set of n players (agents). A coalition game (N, v) with transferable utility for the player set N is 
characterised by a function v that measures the worth v(S) of any non-empty subset S ⊆ N. In this sense, v(S) 
denotes the total jointly earned payoff or benefit of a coalition S, that can be distributed among all members 
of S. Of course, each member makes an individual contribution that has to be considered when determining 
individual payoff.
The characteristic function v allows to assess the worth of a coalition in the context of a given scenario 
but gives no hints on how to share it. Shapley (Shapley, 1953) defined a value for games that exhibits certain 
fairness properties (Ma et al., 2007). The Shapley value φi that is assigned to player i according to a given char-
acteristic function v in a coalition game (N, v) that determines the gain is defined as
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2009) studies several examples from the transport sector with numbers of drivers or trucks and costs expressed
in dollar. In the use case studied in (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b), the utility has to be expressed as the
contribution that eases a joint planning problem (jointly planning individual load for gaining a wanted aggregated
schedule) what has to be expressed in terms of traits and size of individual search spaces of alternative schedules
and thus in terms of individual flexibility. The actually chosen schedule is not necessarily proportional to the
utility of the unit because the richness of offered opportunities (moreover in case of having backup capabilities
for later re-scheduling) has to be considered; not the taken choice.
Distributing joint cost is a long discussed topic (Friedman and Moulin, 1999). The division of surplus has
use cases and applications in production (Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Sen, 1966), electricity pricing (Lima et al.,
1995), public goods (Mas-Colell, 1980; Champsaur, 1975), and other situations modeled by cooperative games.
Cooperative game theory is concerned with problems from coalition formation in multi agent systems and
desirable properties of such coalitions (Fatima et al., 2008; Rapoport, 1970). Among others, cooperative game
theory offers concepts for fair distribution of jointly earned gains among all members of a coalition. The Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) is such a concept for fair payoff distribution (Hsu and Soo, 2009).
If cooperative behaviour is enforced by offering better payoff for an agent within coalitions (groups of
players), the competition is between coalitions rather than between individual agents. Such game is said to be a
coalition game. If the utility may be exchanged between players (for example by side payments) the game is said
to have a transferable utility.
Let N be a set of n players (agents). A coalition ga e (N,v) with transferable utility for the player set N is
characterised by a function v that easures the worth v(S) of any non-e pty subset S N. In this sense, v(S)
denotes the total jointly earned payoff or benefit of a coalition S, that can be distributed among all members of S.
Of course, each member makes an individual contribution that has to be considered when determining individual
payoff.
The characteristic function v allows to assess the worth of a coalition in the context of a given scenario but
gives no hints on how to share it. Shapley (Shapley, 1953) defined a value for games that exhibits certain fairness
properties (Ma et al., 2007). The Shapley value ϕi that is assigned to player i according to a given characteristic






The term v(S∪{i})−v(S) in (5) refers to the marginal contribution of player i to the value of the whole coalition
(Liben-Nowell et al., 2012).
The marginal contribution defines to what extend a player i contributes to the overall gain or phrased
differently: how important player i is for the coalition. The value assigns a unique distribution of the total
generated surplus among all members of a coalition based on the marginal contributions. Shapley values
determine a fair distribution.
Especially, Shapley values are the only value distribution scheme that has all of the following four properties
(cf. e.g. (Hsu and Soo, 2009)):
1. Pareto-efficiency: The total value of a coalition is distributed among the members: ∑i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N)
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The term v(S∪{i}) −v(S) in (5) refers to the marginal contribution of player i to the value of the whole coalition 
(Liben-Nowell et al., 2012).
The marginal contribution defines to what extend a player i contributes to the overall gain or phrased differ-
ently: how important player i is for the coalition. The value assigns a unique distribution of the total generated 
surplus among all members of a coalition based on the marginal contributions. Shapley values determine a fair 
distribution.
Especially, Shapley values are the only value distribution scheme that has all of the following four properties 
(cf. e.g. (Hsu and Soo, 2009)):
1. Pareto-efficiency: The total value of a coalition is distributed among the members: ∑i∈N φi(v) = v(N)
2. Symmetry: The value can be determined regardless of the name of the players. If for any two players i 
and j the following relation holds: v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{j}) for every subset S ⊆ N with S ∪ {i, j} = ∅, then 
φi (v) = φj (v).
3. Additivity: This property requires for any two games φi (N, v), φi (N, v*) that the following relation 
holds: φi (N, v) + φi (N, v*) = φi (N, v + v*) ∀i ∈N.
4. Zero player: If the marginal value of a player to any possible coalition is zero, this player gains a value 
of zero: v(S∪i) = v(S) ∀S ⇒ ϕi (v) = 0.
Calculating Shapley values in general is intractable (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994; Matsui and Matsui, 
2001) because the calculation is often #p-complete (Valiant, 1979). The complexity depends on the value func-
tion v. There are some special cases where computational feasible calculations or at least approximations of 
Shapley values are known, e.g. supermodular games (Liben-Nowell et al., 2012).
Weighted voting games are an example with computationally hard Shapley values (Fatima et al., 2008). In 
such games a coalition gets a reward of 1 if the sum of individual weight values assigned to each agent is larger 
or equal to some given threshold and 0 elsewise. For a smart grid use case this could translate as follows: if a 
coalition has to jointly archive at least power q, each generator (or its controlling agent respectively) is assigned 
a weight of its generation power pi. A generator coalition is rewarded if ∑i pi ≥ q. An extension to this example 
could demand that the deviation of the joint power to the demanded power is below some given threshold. 
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Another use case would devalue larger deviations from the target schedule and thus continuously evaluate gains 
by the actually achieved similarity of demanded and achieved schedule.
Several methods have been proposed to approximate Shapley values for coalition games. Mann and Shap-
ley started with proposing a method based on Monte Carlo simulations in (Mann and Shapley, 1960), but 
without suggesting how to draw necessary samples of coalitions; a more comprehensive analysis of sampling 
approaches can be found in (Bachrach et al., 2008). In (Owen, 1972) a multi-linear extension approach with 
linear time complexity has been proposed, which has but to be weakened in practice due to approximation 
error (Leech, 2003); (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1994) proposed a method based on choosing random per-
mutations from coalitions. In the following, a randomized approach from (Fatima et al., 2008) with linear 
complexity is discussed.
The individual contribution to the quality of the solution that an agent offers to the coalition is the individual 
search space and its abilities, not the finally picked schedule. This search space determines the set (size, vari-
ability, suitability for the problem at hand, backup capacity for robustness, and diversity) of alternative choices 
from that an planning algorithm might choose. In case of a many-objective version of the above sketched prob-
lem, cost indicators for a cost effective choice of alternatives would also be part of the search space.
As has been mentioned, Shapley values provide an ideal means for calculating fair distribution keys. Unfor-
tunately, they are computationally hard to determine in larger VPPs. In order to make nevertheless use of these 
indicators as a base for sharing the surplus, e. g. (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) used a Monte Carlo based 
estimation scheme after (Fatima et al., 2008) for the case of VPPs.
The method basically works as follows: instead of calculating all marginal contributions to all possible 
sub-coalitions of a given player j, draw a random sample of n coalitions with size 1, 2, . . . , n. The average of 
the marginal contributions of Player j in the random sample is taken as an approximation φ̂j (v) for the Shapley 
value φj (v). Obviously, this approximation can be achieved with linear time complexity O(n).
Now, the marginal contribution of a DER for a coalition within the sketched smart grid load balancing sce-
nario is to be defined. A VPP is first and foremost aiming at resembling a given load schedule as close as possi-
ble. For this reason, it seems appropriate to choose a metric that measures the distance between achieved load 
and wanted load as basis, because this metric is also used as (at least one) objective during optimization. In this 
way, the marginal contribution is proportional to the difference between the minimal distance that a coalition 
can achieve with agent j and the minimal distance achieved without agent j (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b):
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with c( j,S) denoting the marginal contribution of agent j to coalition S and δmin(·, ·) denoting the minimal
distance (best product resemblance) that a coalition may achieve. The reciprocal of the distance is used, because
achieving a small distance is of a bigger value for the coalition. Please note, that calculating a single marginal
contribution already involves two predictive scheduling optimization tasks. The schedules s(i) of agents i are
chosen in a way that the coalition as a whole gets off best, e.g. in a way that the sum resembles the target load
P as close as possible and are therefore the result of an optimization process. More elaborated versions are
discussed in (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b).
In the Monte Carlo approach, the marginal contribution (i. e. Eq. 6) from a sample of coalitions is averaged







c( j,SX ), (7)
with SX denoting a random coalition with size X . In any case, the predictive scheduling optimization problem
has to be solved multiple times during the estimation process for calculating marginal contributions.
The task of the optimization process is to determine how good (close in the sense of distance between
schedules) a given coalition can adapt the joint schedule to the product. Then, one can compare how good a
coalition performs with and without a prospective member and thus how much the agent in question may put
forward the group.
In (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) the decoder technique has been harnessed to allow each agent calculate
his own Shapley value according to the following process: After choosing a random set of coalitions for the
Monte Carlo approach mentioned above, an agent may calculate his marginal contribu ons by solving the
respective optimization problems with and without his own contribution. In this way and with the help of the
above mentioned optimization approach all calculations for calculating an agent’s own Shapley value can be done
by the agent itself, if each agent has access to all search space models in the coalition as decoders. The agents in
(Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) internally used a centralized approach. Because, a decoder abstracts from
any specific DER and thus does not disclose any private information or key performance indicator, no private
information is revealed directly. Nevertheless, as information might be derived from a decoder indirectly, we
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with c(j, S) denoting the marginal contribution of agent j to coalition S and δmin (·, ·) denoting the minimal 
distance (best product resemblance) that a coalition may achieve. The reciprocal of the distance is used, because 
achieving a small distance is of a bigger value for the coalition. Please note, that calculating a single marginal 
contribution already involves two predictive scheduling optimization tasks. The schedules s(i) of agents i are 
chosen in a way that the coalition as a whole gets off best, e.g. in a way that the sum resembles the target load 
P as close as possible and are therefore the result of an optimization process. More elaborated versions are dis-
cussed in (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b).
In the Monte Carlo approach, the marginal contribution (i. e. Eq. 6) from a sample of coalitions is averaged 
to gain an estimate for the Shapley values:
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the marginal contributions of Player j in the random sample is taken as an approximation ϕ̂ j(v) for the Shapley
value ϕ j(v). Obviously, this approximation can be achieved with linear time complexity O(n).
Now, the marginal contribution of a DER for a coalition within the sketched smart grid load balancing
scenario is to be defined. A VPP is first and foremost aiming at resembling a given load schedule as close as
possible. For this reason, it seems appropriate to choose a metric that measures the distance between achieved
load and wanted load as basis, because this metric is also used as (at least one) objective during optimization. In
this way, the marginal contribution is proportional to the difference between the minimal distance that a coalition
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with SX denoting a random coalition with size X . In any case, the predictive scheduling optimization problem
has to be solved multiple times during the estimation process for calculating marginal contributions.
The task of the optimization process is to determine how good (close in the sense of distance between
schedules) a given coalition can adapt the joint schedule to the product. Then, one can compare how good a
coalition performs with and without a prospective member and thus how much the agent in question may put
forward the group.
In (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) the decoder technique has been harnessed to allow each agent calculate
his own Shapley value according to the following process: After choosing a random set of coalitions for the
Monte Carlo approach mentioned above, an agent may calculate his marginal contributions by solving the
respective optimization problems with and without his own contribution. In this way and with he help of the
above mentioned optimization approach all calculations for calculating an agent’s own Shapley value can be done
by the agent itself, if each agent has access to all search space models in the coalition as decoders. The agents in
(Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) internally used a centralized approach. Because, a decoder abstracts from
any specific DER and thus does not disclose any private information or key performance indicator, no private
information is revealed directly. Nevertheless, as information might be derived from a decoder indirectly, we
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with SX denoting a random coalition with size X. In any case, the predictive scheduling optimization problem 
has to be solved multiple times during the estimation process for calculating marginal contributions.
The task of the optimization process is to determine how good (close in the sense of distance between sched-
ules) a given coalition can adapt the joint schedule to the product. Then, one can compare how good a coalition 
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performs with and without a prospective member and thus how much the agent in question may put forward 
the group.
In (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) the decoder technique has been harnessed to allow each agent cal-
culate his own Shapley value according to the following process: After choosing a random set of coalitions 
for the Monte Carlo approach mentioned above, an agent may calculate his marginal contributions by solving 
the respective optimization problems with and without his own contribution. In this way and with the help of 
the above mentioned optimization approach all calculations for calculating an agent’s own Shapley value can 
be done by the agent itself, if each agent has access to all search space models in the coalition as decoders. 
The agents in (Bremer and Sonnenschein, 2013b) internally used a centralized approach. Because, a decoder 
abstracts from any specific DER and thus does not disclose any private information or key performance indica-
tor, no private information is revealed directly. Nevertheless, as information might be derived from a decoder 
indirectly, we will here extend the idea and argue how determining such surplus distribution keys can also be 
determined fully decentralized using the very same approach of interlocked COHDA processes.
Each agent may draw a random set of coalitions (subsets of the existing coalition the agent is currently 
taking part in) and initiate a COHDA process for determining the best product fulfillment that the questioned 
coalition may achieve with and without the agents contribution. Thus, actually two COHDA optimization pro-
cesses have to be issued for each coalition in an agents list. After averaging over the marginal contributions, 
each agent knows its own Shapley value. If the communication messages or rather the exchanged work mem-
ories are annotated with a key identifying the issuing agent as well as with an ID that identifies the questioned 
coalitions (note: the ID only has a meaning to the issuing agent), all optimization processes can be started at the 
same time and executed asynchronously in parallel. Simply, each agent needs – in addition to basic COHDA – 
a means for managing several communication networks and thus neighborhoods at the same time as opposed 
to managing just one single secondary network for the coalition formation process. Calculations regarding the 
different parallel optimization processes for Shapley value determination are done fully on circulated working 
memories and not on local information – accept for the current operational status of the device and the resulting 
restrictions for the flexibility. But, these are the same for all optimization processes and thus need no additional 
management.
In this way, the COHDA protocol can be easily used also for determining a fair distribution scheme when it 
comes to accounting at the end of life of a coalition.
6. Conclusion
We presented a fully decentralized approach to coalition formation based on the combinatorial heuristics 
COHDA. This approach fully relies on exchange of messages and local decisions and thus also allows for the 
integration of private interests. No information about the own flexibilities or any underlying models of private 
operation constraints have to be revealed to other agents. A major contribution is the integration of dynamically 
changing flexibilities by means of decoders, allowing coalitions to valuate traits and size of individual search 
spaces for specific product fulfilment.
The results are promising and show an acceptably small computational footprint due to the fully decentral-
ized, parallel calculations. With decentralized coalition structure generation, a further building block is avail-
able for fully decentralized energy management.
Self-organized coalitions of agents from different owners that plan, produce and sell active power products 
jointly generated by units from different owners, need a scheme for fair distribution of jointly gained payoffs 
afterwards. Shapley values are a well-known means of calculating fair shares of payoff for all members of a 
coalition. We further have proposed a scheme for decentralized coalition formation by using interlocked gos-
siping based agent heuristics for determining the coalition structure and discussed the applicability of basically 
the same interwoven scheme for calculating the distributions keys for profit afterwards.
In this way, by extending COHDA to allow more than one interlocked instances, the whole life cycle of coa-
litions starting from formation according to a product portfolio, predictive product fulfilment planning up to fair 
energy flexibility based accounting after product delivery can be tackled decentralized with a single protocol.
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